Abstract
Peter Vanderschraaf’s Strategic Justice provides a defense of the egalitarian bargaining solution. Vanderschraaf’s discussion of the egalitarian solution invokes three arguments typically given to support the Nash bargaining solution. Overall, we reinforce Vanderschraaf’s criticism of arguments in favor of the Nash solution and point to potential weaknesses in Vanderschraaf’s positive case for the egalitarian solution.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 1707-1718 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | Philosophical Studies |
Volume | 178 |
Issue number | 5 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - May 2021 |
Keywords
- Convention
- Evolutionary game theory
- Game theory
- Justice as mutual advantage
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy