TY - JOUR
T1 - Lexicographic beliefs and assumption
AU - Dekel, Eddie
AU - Siniscalchi, Marciano
AU - Friedenberg, Amanda
N1 - Funding Information: Eddie Dekel gratefully acknowledges NSF grant SES-1227434 and Amanda Friedenberg gratefully acknowledges NSF grant SES-1358008 . We thank John Farragut for excellent research assistance. Publisher Copyright: © 2016 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2016/5/1
Y1 - 2016/5/1
N2 - Foundations for iterated admissibility (i.e., the iterated removal of weakly dominated strategies) need to confront a fundamental challenge. On the one hand, admissibility requires that a player consider every strategy of their opponents possible. On the other hand, reasoning that the opponents are rational requires ruling out certain strategies. Brandenburger, Friedenberg, Keisler's (BFK, Econometrica, 2008) foundations for iterated admissibility address this challenge with two ingredients: lexicographic beliefs and the concept of "assumption." However, BFK restrict attention to lexicographic beliefs whose supports are essentially disjoint. This restriction does not have a compelling behavioral rationale, or a clear intuitive interpretation. At the same time, it plays a crucial role in BFK's foundations for iterated admissibility-specifically, in their analysis of assumption. We provide an alternate characterization of assumption, which applies to all lexicographic beliefs. We also characterize two variants of assumption, based on two extensions of 'weak dominance' to infinite state spaces. These notions of assumption coincide with BFK's notion when the state space is finite and lexicographic beliefs have disjoint support; but they are different in more general settings. Leveraging these characterization results, we show that disjoint supports do not play a role in the foundations for iterated admissibility.
AB - Foundations for iterated admissibility (i.e., the iterated removal of weakly dominated strategies) need to confront a fundamental challenge. On the one hand, admissibility requires that a player consider every strategy of their opponents possible. On the other hand, reasoning that the opponents are rational requires ruling out certain strategies. Brandenburger, Friedenberg, Keisler's (BFK, Econometrica, 2008) foundations for iterated admissibility address this challenge with two ingredients: lexicographic beliefs and the concept of "assumption." However, BFK restrict attention to lexicographic beliefs whose supports are essentially disjoint. This restriction does not have a compelling behavioral rationale, or a clear intuitive interpretation. At the same time, it plays a crucial role in BFK's foundations for iterated admissibility-specifically, in their analysis of assumption. We provide an alternate characterization of assumption, which applies to all lexicographic beliefs. We also characterize two variants of assumption, based on two extensions of 'weak dominance' to infinite state spaces. These notions of assumption coincide with BFK's notion when the state space is finite and lexicographic beliefs have disjoint support; but they are different in more general settings. Leveraging these characterization results, we show that disjoint supports do not play a role in the foundations for iterated admissibility.
KW - Assumption
KW - Epistemic game theory
KW - Iterated admissibility
KW - Lexicographic probability systems
KW - Weak dominance
KW - Weak dominance in infinite games
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84962423916&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84962423916&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.003
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.003
M3 - Article
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 163
SP - 955
EP - 985
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
ER -