Optimal Delegation in a Multidimensional World

Andreas Kleiner

doi:10.1145/3580507.3597815

Optimal Delegation in a Multidimensional World

Andreas Kleiner

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate an optimal delegation model with multidimensional actions and multidimensional states of the world. The principal is responsible for taking an action, and her payoff is influenced by an unknown state of the world, which represents the agent's private information. No monetary transfers are available. Since the principal's and agent's preferences are not aligned, the agent is unwilling to simply disclose the state. The principal can employ arbitrary mechanisms, including stochastic ones, and her objective is to maximize her expected payoff.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Publisher	Association for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pages	937
Number of pages	1
ISBN (Electronic)	9798400701047
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597815
State	Published - Jul 9 2023
Externally published	Yes
Event	24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2023 - London, United Kingdom Duration: Jul 9 2023 → Jul 12 2023

Publication series

Name	EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

Conference

Conference	24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2023
Country/Territory	United Kingdom
City	London
Period	7/9/23 → 7/12/23

Keywords

multidimensional mechanism design
no transfers
optimal delegation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computer Science (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics
Computational Mathematics
Statistics and Probability

Access to Document

10.1145/3580507.3597815

Cite this

Optimal Delegation in a Multidimensional World. / Kleiner, Andreas.
EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. Association for Computing Machinery, Inc, 2023. p. 937 (EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Kleiner, A 2023, Optimal Delegation in a Multidimensional World. in EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. EC 2023 - Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Association for Computing Machinery, Inc, pp. 937, 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2023, London, United Kingdom, 7/9/23. https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597815

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Optimal Delegation in a Multidimensional World

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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