TY - JOUR
T1 - Optimal transmission switching
T2 - Economic efficiency and market implications
AU - Hedman, Kory
AU - Oren, Shmuel S.
AU - O'Neill, Richard P.
N1 - Funding Information: Acknowledgments This research was supported by the US Department of Energy through a grant administered by the Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions (CERTS), by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and by NSF Grant IIP 0969016.
PY - 2011/10
Y1 - 2011/10
N2 - Traditionally, transmission assets for bulk power flow in the electric grid have been modeled as fixed assets in the short run, except during times of forced outages or maintenance. This traditional view does not permit reconfiguration of the transmission grid by the system operators to improve system performance and economic efficiency. The current push to create a smarter grid has brought to the forefront the possibility of co-optimizing generation along with the network topology by incorporating the control of transmission assets within the economic dispatch formulations. Unfortunately, even though such co-optimization improves the social welfare, it may be incompatible with prevailing market design practices since it can create winners and losers among market participants and it has unpredictable distributional consequences in the energy market and in the financial transmission rights (FTR) market. In this paper, we first provide an overview of recent research on optimal transmission switching, which demonstrates the substantial economic benefit that is possible even while satisfying standard N-1 reliability requirements. We then discuss various market implications resulting from co-optimizing the network topology with generation and we examine how transmission switching may affect locational Marginal Prices (LMPs), i. e., energy prices, and revenue adequacy in the FTR market when FTR settlements are financed by congestion revenues.
AB - Traditionally, transmission assets for bulk power flow in the electric grid have been modeled as fixed assets in the short run, except during times of forced outages or maintenance. This traditional view does not permit reconfiguration of the transmission grid by the system operators to improve system performance and economic efficiency. The current push to create a smarter grid has brought to the forefront the possibility of co-optimizing generation along with the network topology by incorporating the control of transmission assets within the economic dispatch formulations. Unfortunately, even though such co-optimization improves the social welfare, it may be incompatible with prevailing market design practices since it can create winners and losers among market participants and it has unpredictable distributional consequences in the energy market and in the financial transmission rights (FTR) market. In this paper, we first provide an overview of recent research on optimal transmission switching, which demonstrates the substantial economic benefit that is possible even while satisfying standard N-1 reliability requirements. We then discuss various market implications resulting from co-optimizing the network topology with generation and we examine how transmission switching may affect locational Marginal Prices (LMPs), i. e., energy prices, and revenue adequacy in the FTR market when FTR settlements are financed by congestion revenues.
KW - Financial transmission rights
KW - Optimal transmission switching
KW - Power generation dispatch
KW - Power system economics
KW - Power transmission economics
KW - Revenue adequacy
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=80052259613&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=80052259613&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11149-011-9158-z
DO - 10.1007/s11149-011-9158-z
M3 - Article
SN - 0922-680X
VL - 40
SP - 111
EP - 140
JO - Journal of Regulatory Economics
JF - Journal of Regulatory Economics
IS - 2
ER -