Abstract
We find that firms grant more rank and file stock options when involved in financial reporting violations, consistent with managements’ incentives to discourage employee whistle-blowing. Violating firms grant more rank and file options during periods of misreporting relative to control firms and to their own option grants in non-violation years. Moreover, misreporting firms that grant more rank and file options during violation years are more likely to avoid whistle-blowing allegations. Although the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) offers financial rewards to encourage whistle-blowing, our findings suggest that firms discourage whistle-blowing by giving employees incentives to remain quiet about financial irregularities.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 277-300 |
| Number of pages | 24 |
| Journal | Journal of Accounting and Economics |
| Volume | 62 |
| Issue number | 2-3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Nov 1 2016 |
Keywords
- Misreporting
- Stock options
- Whistle-blowing
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Accounting
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
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