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Rationality, cooperation, and common pool resources

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › peer-review

Abstract

Substantial dissatisfaction has emerged with the conceptualization of natural resource problems and individual decision making as represented in the tragedy of the commons model by Garret Hardin. A research program devoted to developing a theory of common pool resources that accounts for both successes and failures of cooperation among appropriators using common pool resources is reviewed. The theory identifies a set of configural attributes of resources and appropriators that, if present, support the emergence of self-governing arrangements. The model of individual decision making on which the tragedy of the commons is based - perfect rationality - is also challenged. Perfect rationality cannot account for cooperation. Alternative models of decision making are explored.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)801-819+763
JournalAmerican Behavioral Scientist
Volume45
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2002

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Psychology
  • Cultural Studies
  • Education
  • Sociology and Political Science
  • General Social Sciences

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