@inbook{d802d6bab9c24f789db9f112c38f6858,
title = "Self-Admissible sets",
abstract = "Best-response sets (Pearce [1984]) characterize the epistemic condition of {"}rationality and common belief of rationality.{"}When rationality incorporates a weak-dominance (admissibility) requirement, the self-Admissible set (SAS) concept (Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler [2008]) characterizes {"}rationality and common assumption of rationality.{"}We analyze the behavior of SAS's in some games of interest-Centipede, the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, and Chain Store. We then establish some general properties of SAS's, including a characterization in perfect-information games.",
keywords = "admissibility, epistemic game theory, iterated admissibility, perfect-information games, self-Admissible sets, weak dominance",
author = "Adam Brandenburger and Amanda Friedenberg",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2014 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.",
year = "2023",
month = sep,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1142/9789814513449_0008",
language = "English (US)",
series = "World Scientific Series in Economic Theory",
publisher = "World Scientific",
pages = "213--249",
editor = "Adam Brandenburger",
booktitle = "World Scientific Series in Economic Theory",
address = "United States",
}