The genuine attitude view of fictional belief

Wesley Buckwalter; Katherine Tullmann

doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805403.003.0011

The genuine attitude view of fictional belief

Wesley Buckwalter, Katherine Tullmann

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

The distinct-attitude view of fictional narratives is a standard position in contemporary aesthetics. This is the view that cognitive attitudes formed in response to fictions are a distinct kind of mental state from beliefs formed in response to non-fictional scenarios, such as pretend or imaginary states. This chapter argues that the balance of functional, behavioral, and neuroscientific evidence best supports the genuine-attitude view of belief. According to the genuine-attitude view, cognitive responses to fictions are genuine beliefs that are not a distinct kind of mental state from the beliefs that we form in response to non-fictional scenarios. The chapter considers the implications of the genuine-attitude view for debates at the intersection of epistemology, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Art and Belief
Publisher	Oxford University Press
Pages	194-209
Number of pages	16
ISBN (Print)	9780198805403
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198805403.003.0011
State	Published - Nov 23 2017
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Attitudes
Belief
Fiction
Functional role
Imagination
Motivation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Arts and Humanities

Access to Document

10.1093/oso/9780198805403.003.0011

Cite this

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title = "The genuine attitude view of fictional belief",

abstract = "The distinct-attitude view of fictional narratives is a standard position in contemporary aesthetics. This is the view that cognitive attitudes formed in response to fictions are a distinct kind of mental state from beliefs formed in response to non-fictional scenarios, such as pretend or imaginary states. This chapter argues that the balance of functional, behavioral, and neuroscientific evidence best supports the genuine-attitude view of belief. According to the genuine-attitude view, cognitive responses to fictions are genuine beliefs that are not a distinct kind of mental state from the beliefs that we form in response to non-fictional scenarios. The chapter considers the implications of the genuine-attitude view for debates at the intersection of epistemology, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind.",

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AB - The distinct-attitude view of fictional narratives is a standard position in contemporary aesthetics. This is the view that cognitive attitudes formed in response to fictions are a distinct kind of mental state from beliefs formed in response to non-fictional scenarios, such as pretend or imaginary states. This chapter argues that the balance of functional, behavioral, and neuroscientific evidence best supports the genuine-attitude view of belief. According to the genuine-attitude view, cognitive responses to fictions are genuine beliefs that are not a distinct kind of mental state from the beliefs that we form in response to non-fictional scenarios. The chapter considers the implications of the genuine-attitude view for debates at the intersection of epistemology, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind.

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KW - Belief

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KW - Functional role

KW - Imagination

KW - Motivation

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The genuine attitude view of fictional belief

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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