Theories of legislative institutions and the organization of the Russian Duma

Theory: Recent positive theory based on United States congressional studies argues for policy preference-based models to explain the choice of legislative institutions; an alternative theoretical approach holds that reelection goals shape preferences over institutional arrangements. Still other theorists emphasize "supply-side" explanations of partisanship and party leadership in enabling legislators to overcome collective action problems in policy and institutional choice. The question remains whether these diverse approaches can be combined into a single comprehensive theory. Hypotheses: The paper tests predictions flowing from policy, reelection, and party models for candidates' and members' preferences over several major organizational features of the new Russian State Duma, including its steering body, the powers assigned to party factions, and the rights of the chamber's chair. Method: Based on surveys conducted in 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996 among candidates for and deputies in the Duma, the paper reports estimates of the effects of policy positions, electoral mandate type, and party affiliation on participants' preferences for institutional arrangements within the Duma. Results: Evidence consistent with each explanation is found, although none fully accounts for important features of the Duma's organization. We conclude that theoretical progress in this field is not likely to take the form of a unified theory but, at least for the time being, is more likely to take the form of more fully elaborating alternative perspectives and testing their implications directly against each other for particular aspects of institutional choice.