Abstract
The vast majority of corporate governance research is grounded in agency theory and focuses on the relationships between various governance configurations and firm performance. Empirical results, however, are largely unsupportive. This has led researchers to consider alternative and multi-theoretical lenses and outcome measures. Consistent with this emerging tradition, we compare insights from agency and resource dependence theories to examine the elections of over 2,000 Fortune 500 directors. By studying actual voting behaviors, we provide new perspective to understanding director elections as a governance process. Employing a multi-level approach, we find support for relationships between several director characteristics and shareholder opposition to directors up for (re-)election to the board.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Academy of Management 2008 Annual Meeting: The Questions We Ask, AOM 2008 |
| State | Published - 2008 |
| Event | 68th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2008 - Anaheim, CA, United States Duration: Aug 8 2008 → Aug 13 2008 |
Other
| Other | 68th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, AOM 2008 |
|---|---|
| Country/Territory | United States |
| City | Anaheim, CA |
| Period | 8/8/08 → 8/13/08 |
Keywords
- Boards of directors
- Director election
- Shareholder votes
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Management Information Systems
- Management of Technology and Innovation